This Week in the Americas
Timely Demise for Free Trade Area of the Americas
By Laura Carlsen
The stage was set for a showdown. When the Bush cabinet announced intentions to revive the moribund Free Trade Area of the Americas at the Fourth Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata, the countries of the Southern Common Market closed ranks to prevent it. What followed was a diplomatic melee that reflects not so much divisions within Latin America, as a growing resistance to the current free trade model throughout the developing world.
The U.S. government was determined to come out of the meeting with a revitalized FTAA because the administration feared that if the negotiations were left to languish, momentum could be lost for the initiative at a crucial time. The FTAA was first launched by George W. Bush's father, but after ten years of inconclusive talks and significant differences between the countries, the goal of a hemisphere-wide NAFTA remained elusive.
Laura Carlsen directs the Americas Program of the International Relations Center, online at www.irc-online.org.
See full article online at:
http://americas.irc-online.org/am/2954
With printer-friendly PDF version at:
http://americas.irc-online.org/pdf/commentary/0511demise.pdf
Natural Resources in the U.S.-Andean Free Trade Agreement
By Ariela Ruiz Caro
The blueprint for integration of the Community of Andean Nations (CAN) follows the neoliberal accumulation model that took root in the 1990s. The result has been a significant reduction of the power of the State to regulate trade and define economic policies and a sharp turn toward export promotion. A small core of big businesses continues to gain control over market segments, while small- and medium-sized businesses struggle to participate in regional and international trade at all. And yet, it is this latter group that generates 70% of the employment in the Andean region.
In this context, the United States' strategy to form a Free Trade Area of the Americas by way of free trade agreements consolidates this development model and impedes regional integration initiatives. Countries signing these treaties lose their right to enter into preferential trade agreements or other types of special agreements because they are forced to extend the terms to all countries, including industrialized ones. In spite of these considerations, the governments of Andean countries maintain that free trade agreements with the United States will strengthen sub-regional integration.
Ariela Ruiz Caro is a Peruvian economist and international consultant. The original version of this paper was presented at the seminar “Integration and Sustainable Development: The New Geography of Resources, Economics, and Power,” organized by the Latin American Center for Social Equality (CLAES by its Spanish initials) and Development, Economy, Ecology, and Equity (D3E), Montevideo, July 14-15, 2005. She is a contributor to the IRC Americas Program www.americaspolicy.org.
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http://americas.irc-online.org/am/2953
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http://americas.irc-online.org/pdf/reports/0511resources.pdf
“Open Regionalism” or Alternative Regional Integration?
By Eduardo Gudynas
In Latin America, confusion and ambiguity over trade and regional integration continue to be commonplace. Different governments declare their dedication to strengthening relations between countries, but their trade policies indicate otherwise. On this slippery terrain, the concept of “open regionalism” has often been used to justify very different stances.
In practice, “open regionalism” has been associated with projects as discordant as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Community of Andean Nations, Mercosur, and even unilateral trade policies like those practiced by Chile. It has been defended from orthodox economic stances, but it has also been invoked in progressive politics. So, what is “open regionalism” and what is its recent history in Latin America?
Eduardo Gudynas is an information analyst at D3E (Desarrollo, Economía, Ecología y Equidad en América Latina; www.globalization.org). He is a regular columnist for the IRC Americas Program (online at www.americaspolicy.org). The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author. Email: globalizaciond3e@gmail.com.
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http://americas.irc-online.org/am/2904
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http://americas.irc-online.org/pdf/columns/0510gudynas.pdf
It's Time to Boost, Not Reduce, Trinational Environmental Cooperation
By Gustavo Alanis-Ortega
The Mexican government announced in September that it was making a significant reduction in Mexico's contribution to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC).
The CEC is a product of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) environmental side accord, created in response to demands from civil society, unions, academics, and Congressional representatives from Mexico, Canada, and the United States. It was created to monitor the environmental impacts that the free trade agreement would bring to the region and lay the foundations for joint work on environmental issues. Among its objectives were: establishing the bases for coordinated public environmental policy; increasing cooperation between the three countries; strengthening cross-boundary development and enforcement of environmental regulations, policies, and practices; encouraging transparency and public participation in environmental rules and policies; and promoting pollution prevention.
Gustavo Alanis-Ortega is the director of the Mexican Environmental Law Center (Cemda), based in Mexico City, and writes regularly for the IRC Americas Program (online at http://americas.irc-online.org/).
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http://americas.irc-online.org/am/2914
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http://americas.irc-online.org/pdf/commentary/0511boost.pdf
Cellulose and Eucalyptus Production: Two Sides of a Predatory Model
By Raúl Zibechi
The construction of two huge cellulose factories on the Uruguay River that threaten to pollute the binational stream illustrates how a model of forestry imposed by neoliberalism in the 1990s is gaining ground in the Southern Cone.
Standing on a makeshift stage in the center of Montevideo, writer Eduardo Galeano addressed the crowd in a calm tone: “There are decisions that are made in 15 minutes but have consequences for centuries.” It was May 27, 2005 during a demonstration against the construction of two huge cellulose factories on the shores of the Uruguay River. It was not the first time that environmental and social organizations had taken to the streets to protest the two megaprojects, which threaten to pollute the country's main river, shared with Argentina.
Raúl Zibechi is a member of the council of the weekly newspaper Brecha in Montevideo, teacher and researcher on social movements in the Franciscan Multiversity of Latin America, and adviser to various social groups. He is a monthly collaborator of the IRC Americas Program http://americas.irc-online.org/.
See full article online at:
http://americas.irc-online.org/am/2901
With printer-friendly PDF version at:
http://americas.irc-online.org/pdf/reports/0510cellulose.pdf
Letters from our Readers:
To the Americas Program Editor:
Tom Barry's article, “What to Do About Hugo?” of August 25, 2005 ( http://americas.irc-online.org/am/415 ), contains insightful recommendations for improving USA foreign policy toward Latin America. However, I would offer two points of criticism.
First, Mr. Barry doesn't seem to like Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez very much, and seems to recognize Chávez's successes only reluctantly. I infer this from Mr. Barry's choice of title, from his insertion of querulous disparaging phrases here and there, such as
“Chavez may be grandstanding,” and “his Bolivarian rhetoric is opportunistic or populist in the worst sense,”
and his offering advice on how the USA can “counter or balance the rapidly increasing influence of Chavez.” This kind of carping at the edges isn't necessary, and detracts from Mr. Barry's theme.
Second, and much more importantly, Mr. Barry seems to rewrite history when he references President Franklin D. Roosevelt's good neighbor (sic) policy as one that “can point the way toward more constructive U.S.-Latin American relations.” Three examples of Roosevelt's policy come to mind that would belie Mr. Barry's claim:
In 1933, unable to crush the popular resistance/revolution against his regime, Cuban President Gerardo Machado resigned. Roosevelt wouldn't recognize the leftist provisional government that ensued, and it lasted only 17 days. With Roosevelt's blessing, Fulgencio Batista eventually emerged as dictator, suppressing freedom and equality in Cuba until 1959, when he was overthrown by Fidel Castro.
In 1937, with Roosevelt's approval and tacit support, Anastasio Somoza overthrew the legitimate government of Nicaraguan President Juan Sacasa. Once in power, Somoza committed countless human rights violations, and illegally amassed personal land holdings the size of El Salvador. Two generations of the dictator's family ruled Nicaragua for the next 40 years, until overthrown in the Sandinista revolution.
Near his death in 1945, Roosevelt opened the School of the Americas in Panama. Since then, more than 60,000 Latin American students have learned counter-insurgency, weapons training, psychological warfare, and “interrogation” techniques at the SOA. With many dictators, assassins, and general hatchet men among its graduates, the SOA (now located at Fort Benning, Georgia, and renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation) is held in contempt throughout Latin America.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment.
Sincerely,
Michael Stallard
Flagstaff, Arizona
