This year marks the sixth and final year of U.S. commitments to Plan Colombia. In the coming months, the U.S. Congress will debate whether to renew support and what the nature of that support will be. The Bush administration has requested an extension of aid to Colombia like that proposed the past five years--both in amount and in the ratio of military to economic development assistance. But this critical juncture offers a propitious opportunity to re-evaluate U.S. interests in the region and to ascertain whether Plan Colombia actually serves those interests.

In recent years, U.S. interests and goals in Colombia have covered a broad range of areas: counter-narcotics; counterinsurgency and counterterrorism; peace and regional stability; democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; and socio-economic development and humanitarian needs. What is less clear is whether current U.S. policies further these objectives. A full evaluation must take into account both the intended and unintended consequences of our policies.

Plan Colombia and the Evolution of U.S. Policy (2000-2005)

All of the aforementioned interests were to some extent--but in varying and shifting degrees--addressed in the so-called “Plan Colombia,” presented by Colombia’s former president, Andres Pastrana (1998-2002).1 Plan Colombia was a multi-year national development strategy originally likened to the Marshall Plan and designed to bring about a lasting peace by addressing the growing violence and illicit crop cultivation in Colombia as symptoms of deeper issues of poverty, exclusion, and social and economic inequities.

As originally conceived, Pastrana envisioned Plan Colombia first and foremost as a peace plan. By the late 1990s, the conflict in Colombia had intensified and Colombia had become one of the most violent countries in the world. A tremendous activism on the part of civil society ushered Pastrana into office in 1998 on a peace mandate based on his campaign platform and promises to open discussions with Colombia ’s main insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

Pastrana’s Plan Colombia also responded to a severe economic crisis--Colombia’s worst in 70 years--characterized by economic stagnation as a result of the conflict. By 1999, Colombia’s unemployment rate had risen to a historic high of 20%, its GDP had plummeted, and its debt and debt-servicing burden was veering upward. To make matters worse, an earthquake in January 1999 shook the coffee belt, further devastating the economy.

With the advent of U.S. support for Plan Colombia (P.L. 106-246), the United States significantly skewed the nature of the Plan from one focused on peace and social investment to one focused primarily on security. Pastrana’s original proposal did not include a military component as part of the package; that element was added later at the urging of U.S. officials. U.S. policymakers encouraged the Colombians to shift the bulk of the proposed aid away from development aid toward military and police assistance and training.2

The Plan depended for its implementation on raising $7.5 billion dollars, of which $3.5 billion would come from the international community. The United States promised an initial $1.3 billion--$180 million of which was for Colombia’s neighbors, $250 million to buy planes and equipment for U.S. agencies, and the remaining $860 million in other aid for Colombia. European governments (with the exception of Spain, which pledged $100 million) were reluctant to come on board to support the revised Plan Colombia, and the European Union pointedly channeled its contributions toward nongovernmental organizations--outside of the control of either the U.S. or Colombian governments.3

U.S. aid to Colombia has grown dramatically in the past five years. In FY2000, it skyrocketed from $50 million to nearly $1 billion, causing legislative conferees on the bill for Plan Colombia to note their concern over the “rapid, new, and unprecedented levels of spending requested.”4 U.S. financial engagement in Colombia since then has continued to grow. From 2000-2005, support for Colombia, disbursed through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (also known as the Andean Regional Initiative) and related programs, totaled approximately $3.9 billion, making Colombia one of the top U.S. aid recipients in the world (after Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Afghanistan, and, if the supplemental passes unchanged, Pakistan and Jordan).5 Some 80% of this aid--$3.14 billion--has gone to the military and police for counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics, and oil pipeline protection.

The U.S. presence in Colombia has also grown. In 2003, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, with 2,000 employees from 32 U.S. agencies, surpassed Cairo as the largest U.S. Embassy in the world.6 (It is now second only to that in Iraq .) In addition, the United States has steadily increased the number of military advisers and private contractors in Colombia, twice lifting the caps that Congress put in place in the initial appropriation in 2000 as a way to limit U.S. engagement and protect against “mission creep.”7 In October 2004, Congress approved raising the caps to allow up to 800 U.S. military advisers/troops and 600 U.S. civilian government contractors in Colombia . Under the terms of the law, the United States is permitted to (and does) contract foreigners above and beyond these caps. U.S. private contractors are not subject to the same restrictions, safeguards, and oversight as the U.S. military.8 Since 1998, 11 U.S.-government-funded contractors have been killed on duty in Colombia, and 3 continue to be held by the FARC since their plane went down in FARC-controlled territory in February 2003.9

The U.S. role in Colombia has broadened significantly since the initial appropriation for Plan Colombia. In the wake of 9/11 , Washington has increasingly chosen to support a “unified campaign” against terrorism and drug trafficking. Earlier, Congress had prohibited the use of military aid for counter-insurgency activities. The division, however, was never very clear, given that the counter-narcotics efforts were intended to take place in a FARC-dominated region of southern Colombia, where the lines between the two were tenuous at best.

In August 2002, Congress passed P.L. 107-206, which allows the Colombians to use U.S. military and police aid for counter-terrorist (and counter-insurgency) as well as counter-narcotics purposes. Weapons, equipment, and training previously approved for counter-narcotics efforts can now be used for counter-insurgency operations in Colombia. Since early 2003, U.S. Special Forces have been training Colombian soldiers in counter-insurgency tactics designed to protect the Cano-Limon pipeline in the guerrilla-dominated Arauca region.

Colombian President Alvaro Uribe’s backing for the U.S. “war on terror” and his re-framing of the long-term internal armed conflict in Columbia as the problem of a state besieged by terrorists has found considerable resonance within some Washington policy circles. General Bantz Craddock, the new head of SOUTHCOM (the U.S. regional military command for Latin America and the Caribbean ), recently noted that the “prosecution of the War on Terrorism” is the top U.S. military priority in the hemisphere.10 In April 2003, in recognition of Uribe’s unequivocal support for the global war on terror, and in particular for his support of the U.S. military intervention in Iraq, the U.S. Congress granted Colombia $105 million--again mostly in military assistance--under the emergency supplemental bill for the war in Iraq.

Finally, the turmoil reigning in the Middle East has increased the importance of good bilateral relations with the Colombian government, given Colombia’s large reserves of petroleum, natural gas, and coal. Colombia ranks eighth among U.S. suppliers of crude oil and together with Venezuela and Ecuador--whose leaders are both on shaky ground with the Bush administration--provides 20% of the total U.S. oil imports.11

Evaluating the Goals and Outcomes of Current U.S. Policies

Nearly $4 billion later, what has been achieved by U.S. policies and investments in Colombia? How close have we come to meeting the goals of our policies? What have been the consequences--both intended and unintended--of our efforts?

The answers to these questions depend largely on which goals, or perhaps which war, we choose to evaluate. U.S. policies toward Colombia, with the possible exception of counter-narcotics policies, have been approved with few mechanisms or explicit targets by which to measure success. As with the war in Iraq, U.S. policymakers appear to agree on broad, yet vague, overall goals for U.S. policy--namely, support for counter-narcotics, counter-insurgency, and counterterrorism actions; support for peace and regional stability; support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; and promoting socio-economic development and the fulfillment of humanitarian needs.

Yet policymakers have reached no real consensus on U.S. priorities or strategies with regard to these general (and sometimes conflicting) goals. They have backed the escalation of the drug war and the “war on terror” on Colombian soil, but this approach does not appear to be bringing Colombia any closer to peace or to addressing the root causes of the conflict. Building consensus for a coherent, integrated peace strategy is complicated by different institutional and constituent interests as well as a proliferation of data, statistics, and analysis that are often contradictory, inadequate, or misleading.

1) Counter-Narcotics

U.S. support for Plan Colombia, now subtitled, “A Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State,” underscored the need to strengthen the state as the vehicle for addressing the drug problem. Colombia supplies more cocaine to the United States than any other country in the world. When Plan Colombia was approved, Colombian drug traffickers were supplying 80% of the U.S. cocaine market.12 Today this portion has grown. Over 90% of the cocaine (and about half of the heroin) consumed in the United States is reportedly produced in or transits through Colombia .13

Reduction of drug use in the United States is clearly in the U.S. interest. It was a driving force for the initial support for Plan Colombia, and remains a key concern of U.S. policymakers. In 2003, the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) estimated that illegal drug use kills 19,000 Americans annually, with an additional 50,000 lives lost indirectly, and that illegal drug use costs the United States economy more than $160 billion in lost revenue annually.14

In Colombia, drug trafficking and the associated scourges of corruption and impunity have permeated the economic, political, security, and legal institutions of the country, and have increasingly fueled violent conflict. Drug traffickers have displaced peasants and taken over their lands in a “reverse” agrarian reform that has further consolidated the economic and political power of the drug lords and their many allies.

U.S. support for Plan Colombia has focused largely on attacking the supply side of the drug equation. The United States has endorsed and funded aerial fumigation programs to destroy the coca and poppy plants used in the manufacture of illicit narcotics. To a much lesser degree, it has also supported voluntary manual eradication and alternative development as well as interdiction programs. Plan Colombia established a target goal to reduce by half coca crop cultivation and the processing and distribution of cocaine by 2005, and to eradicate coca fields completely by the end of President Uribe’s term in office in 2006.

By some measures, the 2005 goal was nearly met in 2003, but more recent figures suggest that increases in coca cultivation are offsetting the increases in fumigation. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Colombian government reported that coca cultivation in Colombia in 2003 declined for the third consecutive year, resulting in a 47% reduction of the total area under coca cultivation since Plan Colombia began in 2000.15 One State Department official announced (prematurely, it seems) that we were at a “tipping point in Colombia,” with seizures and eradications “at record levels.”16

Just released U.S. State Department figures for 2004 suggest it is too soon to claim victory. While eradication is indeed at record levels in Colombia, coca cultivation veered upward again last year, reversing earlier trends, and leading to a net increase of 36% between 2000 and 2004 (from 183,571 hectares in 2000 to 250,555 hectares in 2004).17 Furthermore, SOUTHCOM’s reported interdiction of more than 222 metric tons of cocaine, impressive as it might appear, accounted for only about one-third of the cocaine produced in the Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.18

The apparent success of crop eradication and interdiction efforts must be measured over the long term and within a regional context. In any case, it has yet to translate into a reduction in the supply of drugs to the United States --one of the explicit goals of U.S. policymakers who supported Plan Colombia. Reports show that despite U.S. and Colombian efforts, cocaine and heroin continue to be widely available throughout the United States, cocaine use is on the rise, drug prices have declined, and purity levels are rising.19

The most prevalent theories on why the eradication of coca and poppy plants has not produced a drop in drug availability, an increase in street prices, or a decline in purity offer variations on the so-called “balloon effect.” This theory holds that crop eradication in Colombia has been offset by an increase in illicit crops in neighboring countries (especially Bolivia), an increase in drug processing outside Colombia (especially in Venezuela and Ecuador), or an increase in crops in new or previously cleared areas of Colombia.20 The balloon effect has been seen repeatedly in previous U.S. counter-narcotics efforts. In fact, the rise in coca production in Colombia in the 1990s was directly attributable to the U.S. crackdown on coca production in Peru and Bolivia . From 1995-2000, more than 90,000 hectares of coca were destroyed in Peru and Bolivia, while in the same period, Colombia doubled its production, offsetting 75% of those declines.21

Likewise, a shift in cocaine processing centers seems to be occurring, with laboratories beginning to appear in the countries bordering Colombia, especially Ecuador and Venezuela.22 This shift is neither unprecedented nor completely unexpected. U.S. congressional conferees noted in their report on the law supporting Plan Colombia, “The Committee is concerned that the Administration has placed insufficient financial and political priority on addressing the problems of narcotics trafficking throughout the region. Production and trafficking patterns indicate that effective pressure on one region or country simply pushes the problem into neighboring areas.”23

We may well be seeing the lull before the next storm as new crops are taking root. The UNODC has reported a large-scale geographic shift of coca production to Narino, Cauca, Amazonas (in the Amazon jungle), Choco (on the Pacific Coast), and to Quind and Tolima (in central Colombia). New coca fields accounted for about 70% of the total coca cultivation in 2003.24 While 12 of Colombia ’s 32 provinces had more than 1,000 hectares of coca under cultivation when Plan Colombia began, this number grew to 13 provinces in 2001. By the end of 2003, although overall coca cultivation was reduced to some 86,300 hectares, coca production had spread to 23 departments. Narino, Meta, Bolivar, Antioquia, and Santander all showed double-digit increases of coca cultivation in 2003, and though coca cultivation in Cordoba and Boyaca did not reach 1,000 hectares, these departments showed unanticipated gains of 118% and 403%, respectively.25

Drug production appears to be adapting to current counter-narcotics strategies. Coca eradication programs have apparently forced peasants onto smaller plots of land where they frequently continue to cultivate coca, but are able to escape fumigation and detection. The UNODC reports that the average size of coca fields is declining and that 93% of the coca fields are now less than 3 hectares (7.5 acres).26 Fumigation of these smaller plots is reported to be virtually impossible, raising questions about the long-term sustainability of fumigation approaches if this trend continues.27

Furthermore, new, higher-yield coca is also being developed and produced, as are new fertilizers and leaf-picking systems that improve productivity.28 In addition, coca farmers have found ways to protect their crops by “covering the leaves with sugar-cane syrup (agua de panela) or pruning the fumigated bushes so they grow again.”29 Another theory circulating to explain stable drug prices and the lack of impact on U.S. drug availability suggests that policymakers have ignored the capacity of drug traffickers to stockpile drugs in order to control the flow of drugs exported while waiting for new crops to produce.30

In addition to aerial fumigation, the United States has supported alternative development projects that grant assistance to Colombian farmers who agree to eradicate their illicit crops. However, alternative development has not been as well funded as aerial fumigation programs and scholars charge that alternative development programs have offered “too little, too late.”31 While USAID had predicted that assistance was needed for 136,600 families, only 33,400 families were served by alternative development programs from 2000-2003.32 The U.S. General Accounting Office has criticized the relatively small number of beneficiaries under the alternative development programs.33 Aerial spraying in 2003 eradicated 116,000 hectares of coca, while 8,441 hectares were manually eradicated, and alternative development was offered for only 7% of what was eradicated.

Besides the lack of funding, alternative development programs have been plagued by severe implementation problems (sometimes related to marketing and security issues), have not always been carried out in a timely or coordinated manner, and have been subject to aerial spraying.34

If farmers grow coca and poppies because they lack legal, economically viable alternatives, they must be offered options that are both sustainable and timely.35 In the absence of such options, poor farmers are likely to continue to grow coca. As long as the demand remains constant or increases, drugs will continue to be a profitable venture. Analysts cite the need for a more even-handed approach that addresses both the supply and demand sides of the drug equation, and underscore the cost-effectiveness of both prevention and treatment programs in the countries where drug use creates the demand and makes drug production so profitable.36

2) Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency

Counter-narcotics, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency have been intertwined in Colombia , especially since 9-11, but even before. Original conference language for the appropriation for Plan Colombia stated clearly that the objectives of U.S. funding focused on helping the Colombian military “regain control and increase eradication activities in the southern coca growing region currently dominated by narcotraffickers and the FARC insurgents.”37

FARC-dominated areas have been the primary focus of Plan Colombia , as they have with the more recently implemented Plan Patriota, a major military offensive in the FARC’s former demilitarized zone. It is important to note, nonetheless, that Colombia is home to three groups--the aforementioned FARC, ELN, and the AUC--designated as terrorist by the U.S. State Department.

All of these groups benefit from the drug trade, albeit to different degrees. Paramilitary leader Carlos Castano has claimed that 70% of the income of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) is from drug-related activities.38 Coca “taxes” and other drug-related revenue financed the FARC’s dramatic expansion in the 1990s, and have been said to account for half of its income.39 Some 8% of the income of the National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia ’s second-largest guerrilla group, is said to come from drugs, with kidnapping and extortion of tributes from oil companies, wealthy sectors, and multinational companies accounting for most of the remainder.40

The question is whether U.S. policies have reduced the strength of these three groups. T here are some indications of improved security. Increased military patrols have made Colombia’s main highways more secure and put more drivers back on the roads.41 Nonetheless, in 2003, illegal roadblocks on secondary roads increased by 70%.42 Security analyst and former adviser to the Ministry of Defense Alfredo Rangel reports that there were 631 guerilla attacks on military targets in 2004.43 This was down from the previous year, but on a par with the number of attacks in 2002. Numbers for kidnappings have also shown a clear and steady decline from a high of 3,706 in 2000 to 1,441 in 2004.44 These figures mask the increase in kidnappings by paramilitaries and common criminals, which in the aggregate is offset by a decline in guerrilla kidnappings.45

While the Colombian army reduced rebel attacks on the Occidental Petroleum-managed Cano-Limon oil pipeline in Arauca from 170 in 2001 to 17 in 2004, by February 2005, leftist guerrillas had stepped up their attacks and succeeded in shutting down the pipeline once again, suggesting that their military capacity has not yet been destroyed.46 A wave of guerrilla attacks that left 60 soldiers dead in February 2005 led President Uribe to conclude that the rebels “will not be easily defeated.”47

Former Southern Command General James Hill’s announcement late last year that the FARC would be “combat ineffective” by 2006 thus appears premature . Colombia has been the site of similar ebbs and flows in the past. The declines registered in guerrilla attacks and kidnappings in 2004 may be attributable to the particular political juncture of the past year, relating at least in part to what Rangel has called a “strategic retreat of the FARC” and the “partial ceasefire” of the AUC paramilitary groups as they negotiate their future.48

In the end, such statistics tell us relatively little about the military capacity or strength of insurgent and paramilitary forces. Although no specific target goals were set to evaluate success in the battle against terrorism, by all counts, the illegal armed forces continue to thrive . Guerrilla insurgents and paramilitaries continue to exert control over some 40% of the national territory and to move freely throughout much of the Colombian countryside.49 These groups perform some of the governance tasks of the state--including provision of employment and basic services, as well as “protection” and taxation systems--that give them a broad social base beyond their actual membership.50 They also operate by terrorizing and intimidating communities. Rangel concludes, “[T]he guerrillas have not been critically undermined, the paramilitary groups are gaining strength and the level of activity in the drug trade remains almost unaltered.”51

Estimates of membership in illegal armed groups vary widely and are impossible to confirm. By the most generous assessment, Gen. Bantz Craddock, head of SOUTHCOM, estimates that FARC membership has declined from 18,000 to 12,500 members, that the ELN--with a divided leadership and approximately 3,500 militants--has become marginal, and that the AUC has been reduced to some 12,000 combatants.52 Interestingly, other combatant estimates are considerably lower to start, and thus show significantly less progress. State Department estimates in Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 put FARC combatants at 9,000-12,000, with several thousand additional supporters; ELN membership has generally been estimated at between 3,000-5,000; and State Department estimates for the AUC range from 8,000-12,000.53 Colombian military sources estimate AUC membership at 12,000-19,000, and claim that FARC membership has dropped from 18,000 to 12,000 in the past year.54 Time m agazine, on the other hand, reports that the FARC and AUC currently have about 20,000 members apiece.55 It notes furthermore that t he FARC and AUC bring in an annual combined income of more than $1.5 billion drug dollars a year.56 This lucrative endowment gives e ach of these groups a tremendous capacity for replenishment of their ranks, given the desperate needs of the country’s impoverished and displaced populations.

The Colombian government’s recent initiative to demobilize some members of paramilitary groups is a welcome move that, if done properly and if successful, could remove an important party to the conflict from the battlefield. However, many questions remain about the legitimacy of the process, the lack of an adequate legal framework, and the motivations of the paramilitaries. Colombian and international human rights organizations have expressed concern that paramilitary structures will remain intact and there will be little if any accountability gained from the process as it is currently envisioned, as there is no effort required to investigate if the person demobilizing has in fact committed crimes against humanity--only whether they are already being prosecuted for such crimes. Nor are the demobilized individuals required, before receiving benefits, to turn over illegally acquired assets, cooperate with authorities, or to confess to or make reparations to victims for crimes they have committed.57

U.S. law addresses these concerns insofar as it prohibits funds for the process without a certification by the Secretary of State that an appropriate legal framework has been established that prosecutes human rights violators and drug traffickers, that the Colombian government is taking action to dismantle the paramilitary structures and to enable the return of displaced civilians, and that the U.S. implementation of extradition treaties is not blocked.58 The Department of Justice must also determine that the demobilizing groups are respecting a cease-fire and not engaging in illegal activities.59

Demobilizations of the AUC are proceeding apace amidst the controversy, and from 2003 until the end of 2004, 3,666 paramilitaries had demobilized, and an additional 1,959 paramilitaries had deserted.60 While the cease-fire declared by the AUC in December 2002 may be responsible for the decline of some violence, paramilitary abuses have continued to occur, with more than 1,899 cases of death or forced disappearances at the hands of paramilitary forces (including some who had supposedly demobilized) documented in the first nine months of 2004.61 Credible reports charge, furthermore, that the security forces are continuing to collaborate with the AUC.62

3) Peace and Regional Stability

Is Colombia any closer to peace today than it was when Pastrana proposed peace as the lynchpin of Plan Colombia ? Has U.S. policy assisted in moving Colombia further along the road toward peace and brought us closer to regional stability? Has the United States fully used its diplomatic and economic strength to pursue a peaceful resolution to the conflict?

The conflict in Colombia continues to register high levels of violence and Plan Colombia does not appear to have brought Colombians any closer to peace or to developing a comprehensive strategy that might lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The failure of Pastrana’s three-year effort to reach an agreement between the FARC and the Government of Colombia paved the way for the overwhelming election of Alvaro Uribe in 2002. Uribe’s campaign promises eschewed a negotiated settlement in favor of a military victory on the battlefield. The FARC shows no signs of coming to the negotiating table--Plan Patriota notwithstanding. While there is no cease-fire in effect with the ELN (a pre-condition for negotiations with the Colombian government), the Mexican government offered in 2004 to facilitate peace negotiations between the two parties, and this offer was accepted. But in April 2005, the ELN backed out, citing lack of faith in the Mexican government as a mediator due to its attempt to jail a leftist presidential candidate and its posture toward Cuba . The Colombian government recently dismissed UN Special Envoy James LeMoyne, whose view of the Colombian situation as one of armed conflict between warring parties rather than a terrorist threat to the state by illegal armed groups was considered unacceptable to the Colombian government.63

In the regional context, U.S. military aid to Colombia has shifted the arms balance in the Andean neighborhood, providing at least a pretext for Colombia ’s neighbors to increase their own military expenditures.64 The increased militarization of Colombia ’s neighbors could upset the delicate internal balances of civil-military relations in each of the bordering nations, and has set the stage for the escalation of inter-state violence. Colombia ’s borders tend to be some of the poorest and least developed regions of the country, effectively abandoned by the state, and home to heightened illegal activity--including trafficking in arms, drugs, and other contraband.65 Intermittent cross-border violence has already required Peru , Ecuador , Venezuela , and Brazil to move troops to their borders with Colombia .

The conflict in Colombia has also generated massive increases in refugee flows, particularly over Colombia ’s northeastern border with Venezuela and its shorter, southwestern border with Ecuador .66 Of some 234,000 Colombians seeking refuge abroad at the end of 2003, more than three-fourths of them fled to Venezuela.67 Current estimates for the total number of Colombians living in Ecuador range from 70,000 to 250,000.68

In addition to the tensions caused by the flow of largely poor refugees across Colombia ’s borders, a recent incident in which Colombian authorities bribed Venezuelan officials to kidnap a high-level FARC leader and return him to Colombia brought Colombian-Venezuelan relations close to a breaking point. Venezuela charged the Colombian government with violating national sovereignty; Colombia accused the Venezuelan government of harboring terrorists. At Uribe’s request, Fidel Castro stepped in to negotiate a resolution, but tensions still simmer under the surface, and there are concerns over the potential for another flare-up.

4) Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law

Has U.S. support for Plan Colombia bolstered democracy, and promoted human rights and the rule of law?

The record is mixed, fluctuates, and varies by region. The United States has supported the Colombian government’s human rights protection program that has helped 3,540 elected municipal authorities, human rights workers, medical workers, and journalists; and the U.S. has provided security for the offices of dozens of Colombia ’s leaders, human rights defenders, and local officials.69 These are important programs that have undoubtedly saved lives. An early warning system has also been established to assist in the prevention of violence, but the warnings have frequently languished in the bureaucratic impunity of diffuse responsibility and a lack of political will.

While some improvements in the human rights picture have been noted, overall numbers continue to be worrisome, and there is no guarantee that positive trends will not be readily reversed. Laws that protect victims are not being effectively implemented, offenders are not consistently prosecuted or held accountable for their crimes or human rights violations, and the resulting impunity is eroding Colombia ’s long-standing democratic traditions and contributing to a crisis of democratic credibility.

The U.S. State Department’s human rights report for Colombia for 2004 (based on statistics assembled for the first 8 months of 2004) showed improvement in some areas: killings were down by 16%; massacres declined by 50%; and killings of labor leaders were down by 25% from the previous year.70 Yet these figures proved prematurely optimistic. In the final statistics compiled for the full year, killings of unionists increased from 91 in 2003 to 94 in 2004, with death threats and detentions of unionists soaring dramatically in each of the past three years.71 Nearly half of those killed were teachers, 38 of whom were members of the Colombian Federation of Educators (FECODE).72 Furthermore, even with the reported decline in homicides to the lowest rate in 18 years, the National Police still documented 19,010 killings in 2004.73 This aggregate masks significant variations by region, including both dramatic improvements in places like Medellin and Antioquia, and a worsening of violence in some other regions including Cali, Caqueta, Cauca, Casanare, and Choco.74

Of particular concern is the rise in reports of torture and disappearances, as well as arbitrary detentions and extra-judicial executions carried out by the security forces.75 The Colombian Commission of Jurists reports that the state security forces killed 184 civilians in 2003, up from an annual average of 120 between 1998 and 2002.76 Under Uribe’s “democratic security” policies, arrests without probable cause are up substantially, with most detainees eventually released without charge. In 2003, some 2,140 people were detained arbitrarily without due process, according to the Colombian Commission of Jurists.77 Union members, human rights workers, peasants, and journalists have been particularly at risk. Seventy-five percent of the 123 union members killed worldwide in 2003 were killed in Colombia, mostly by members of paramilitary groups.78 Furthermore, 16 human rights defenders were killed in 2003; high-level government officials, including President Uribe, have suggested that human rights groups are fronts for terrorists, making them even more vulnerable to attacks.79

It is becoming increasingly difficult for civilians to maintain their right to remain neutral in the conflict. Local efforts at peace-building and development have continued despite the conflicted environment and the high risks its proponents assume. The massacre in February 2005 of eight members of the San Jose de Apartado peace community in northwest Colombia, allegedly by army soldiers, has pitted civil society groups that have renounced violence and asserted their right to bar all armed actors--including government security forces--from entering their communities, on the one hand, against the Colombian government, which is asserting its sovereign right to enter any area of national territory, on the other.

With regard to the rule of law, the Uribe administration has provided unprecedented cooperation to U.S. judicial authorities--turning over in the past two and a half years a record 170 Colombians accused of drug-trafficking to stand trial in the United States.80 This is important, but is no replacement for strengthening the implementation of legal protections within Colombia, where despite strong laws and protective mechanisms, 97% of crimes committed go unpunished, and military personnel who violate human rights are rarely prosecuted.

Recent efforts to curtail the independence of the judiciary, a key component of democratic protections and guarantees, are a cause for concern. In December 2004, the Colombian Congress passed a l aw giving the Colombian military controversial powers to make detentions, tap telephones, and conduct searches without warrants or legal orders. Police and military commanders (and U.S. contractors as well) operate with tremendous impunity outside the confines of civilian oversight.81

5) Socio-economic Development and Humanitarian Needs

Turning to the area of socio-economic development and humanitarian needs, has Plan Colombia improved the living conditions for the Colombian population? Is Colombia any closer to prosperity today than when the United States approved its first installment to support Plan Colombia five years ago?

Overall, Colombia’s economy has clearly recovered since its lows in 1999. Yet while Colombia is considered to be a middle-income country, it still continues to have one of the most highly skewed income distribution rates around. The top 1.3% of the population owns some 48% of the best land.82 With an average per capita gross national income (GNI) of $1,810, 64% of the population lives below the poverty line of $3 a day.83 Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities are disproportionately affected by poverty and displacement, as are women and children.

Humanitarian needs today are more desperate than ever. When the U.S. Congress began support for Plan Colombia, it estimated that 1.4 million people had been displaced by drug trafficking and the conflict in Colombia, and expressed concern that “the Army’s push into southern Colombia will exacerbate the current problems of internally displaced people.”84 Plan Colombia gave responsibility for internally displaced persons to NGOs and municipal governments under the Social Solidarity Network, but these have been notoriously underfunded and overwhelmed by the magnitude of the growing problem. The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants reported that by December 31, 2003 , Colombia ’s population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) had reached 2.73 million, making Colombia home to the third-largest population of IDPs in the world.85

Colombian NGOs and the Colombian government report conflicting statistics for displacement, with CODHES reporting a nearly 40% increase to 287,581 in new displacements for 2004, and the Government of Colombia reporting a 37% decline to 137,315 in registered IDPs for that same year.86 The difference is partially explained by methodologies, since the Colombian government counts only those who register their displacement with a governmental agency--a subset of those who are actually displaced. UN officials and NGOs have expressed concern that the current government policy of returning the displaced to their communities as quickly as possible has “placed many at risk and discouraged the newly displaced from registering with the authorities.”87 Thus government statistics on IDPs appear to be measuring a decline in those willing to register, rather than a decline in overall displacement.

Conclusion

While this review of U.S. policies in Colombia is by no means exhaustive, it casts significant doubt on whether U.S. interests are being served by the current policy direction.

First, it suggests that we may need to rethink our current diagnosis of and prescription for the situation in Colombia. Current policy is based on an assessment that blames the lack of state presence and law enforcement capability for the spread of narcotics, terrorism, and insurgency and prescribes strengthening the state as the solution.88 This approach not only fails to address the root causes of the conflict--which include poverty, inequitable land tenure, and political and social exclusion--but it also ignores the role of the state in perpetuating these problems--by omission, through its failure to implement an integrated strategy for rural development, and by commission, through its role in encouraging the development of self-defense groups to fight the guerrillas. U.S. policies must encourage the Colombian state to open up economic and political structures and foster new opportunities for traditionally marginalized populations. They must contain safeguards and evaluation mechanisms to ensure that strengthening state capacity does not entrench problems of inequity and exacerbate conflict.

Second, there seems to be a contradiction between the policy instruments being used and the outcomes desired. Support for Colombia’s military and police may not be the most effective way to support Colombia ’s democratic institutions. The instruments of the state being used to penetrate Colombia ’s interior have been restricted primarily to the security forces, which lack the capacity and resources to provide access to or deliver basic services such as health, education, jobs, and roads--or to address endemic structures of poverty and unemployment. The state presence Washington encourages must include not only police and military, but also educators, health workers, judges, legal advocates, and others whose presence will contribute directly to the improvement of the lives of impoverished, long-neglected, rural populations. Security without development is neither sustainable nor desirable.

Third, U.S. interests and policy goals must be reconciled to ensure that they are not working at cross-purposes. As it now stands, a single-minded U.S. effort to reduce narcotics--laudable as that goal might be--is undermining other goals, including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, democratization, the protection of human rights and the rule of law, improved socio-economic development, and sustainable peace in Colombia and the region. There are indications that the U.S.-supported aerial fumigation in Colombia may be exacerbating the humanitarian crisis by creating additional environmental and health problems, and fostering further displacement, poverty, and food insecurity. Plaintiffs from sprayed areas in Colombia and in bordering regions of Ecuador charge that the aerial spraying of coca and poppy plants is also destroying food crops that are often intercropped with the illicit plants; and that the spraying has displaced large numbers of small farmers, contaminated the water, and has had detrimental health effects on humans and animals alike.89

Likewise, there is concern that U.S. fumigation policies are undermining democratic practices and the rule of law within Colombia . A recent study published by the Washington Office on Latin America concludes that the implementation of these policies has been carried out “in disregard of Colombian legal principles, and against the will of local and regional elected officials.”90 The study cites in particular the circumvention of laws that require prior approval of government health and environmental agencies charged with protecting the environment as well as consultation with affected local communities. The National Police and Colombian government authorities have disregarded recommendations by these groups, and have refused to carry out orders from the Colombian courts to suspend the spraying.

Furthermore, fumigation policies may be directly at odds with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism goals. Witness for Peace reports that many young farmers from Putumayo , the focus of early spraying efforts, are joining the FARC or the AUC after their crops are destroyed by aerial fumigation.91 Similarly, the failure to address adequately the humanitarian crisis of displacement and to promote economic development is leaving fertile terrain for the recruitment of poor youth by guerrillas and paramilitaries alike. A policy that focuses on achieving military victory at the expense of development goals--including jobs, health, and education--as well as the humanitarian needs of displaced populations is unlikely to prove sustainable.

Finally, neither U.S. interests nor Colombian interests are monolithic. A successful policy will need to navigate these multiple interests and contradictions, while forging a partnership based on the areas of agreement. A thoughtful and honest evaluation of our policies of these past five years and the granting of a greater priority to a just and peaceful resolution of the conflict are needed to ensure that our policies will lead to peace and not exacerbate the conflict in Colombia.

Endnotes

1. Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia, Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Hechos de Paz V: Del Dialogo a la Negociacion, Agosto 7 de 1998--Mayo 24 de 1999 (Santa Fe de Bogota: Presidencia de la Republica: Mayo de 1999), pp. 441-66; at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/planco198.htm .
2. Douglas Farah, “ U.S. Ready to Boost Aid to Troubled Colombia ,” Washington Post , Aug. 23, 1999.
3. Ingrid Vaicius, Adam Isacson, and Abbey Steele, “Is Plan Colombia Dead? The Truth Behind the Numbers,” at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/102701.htm.
4. U.S. Senate, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 2001, Conference Report 106-291, p.53.
5. Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels, “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy,” CRS Report for Congress, updated April 15, 2004 .
6. “Statement by William B. Wood before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,” June 3, 2003.
7. See discussion in Maria Clemencia Ramirez Lemus, Kimberly Stanton, and John Walsh,“ Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War,” in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin ( Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), pp. 110-11.
8. See Virginia M. Bouvier, “Colombia Quagmire: Time for U.S. Policy Overhaul,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Americas Program ( Silver City , NM : Interhemispheric Resource Center, Sept. 2003), at http://www.americaspolicy.org/briefs/2003/0309colombia.html; and Deborah Avant, “Privatizing Military Training,” Foreign Policy in Focus 7, no. 6 (May 2002); at http://www.fpif.org/papers/miltrain/box4.html.
9. Adam Isacson, “Congress Doubles the Limit on U.S. Troops in Colombia,” Oct. 8, 2004 ; at http://ciponline.org/colombia/041008cap.htm.
10. Bantz Craddock, “Posture Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock… before the 109 th Congress House Armed Services Committee,” March 9, 2005 ; at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/050309crad.htm.
11. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Why Americans Should Care About Plan Colombia,” Fact Sheet, Feb. 21, 2001.
12. U.S. Senate, Conference Report 106-291, p. 53.
13. U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report--2005, March 2005; at http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/vol1/html/42363.htm.
14. U.S. Dept. of State, “A Report to Congress on United States Policy Toward Colombia and Other Related Issues,” Feb. 3, 2003; at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rpt/17140.htm.
15. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Government of Colombia (GOC), Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey, June 2004, p. 3; at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/colombia/colombia_coca_survey_2003.pdf.
16. Robert B. Charles, “Aid to Colombia: The European Role in the Fight Against Narcoterrorism,” testimony before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Nov. 18, 2004; at http://wwws.house.gov/search97cgi/s97_cgi?action=View&VdkVgwKey=http%3A%2F.
17. “Coca Cultivation and Fumigation in Colombia , 1999-2004,” at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/cocagrowing.htm.
18. Craddock, “Posture Statement.”
19. National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2004, April 2004; John M. Walsh, “Are We There Yet? Measuring Progress in the U.S. War on Drugs in Latin America,” Drug War Monitor (Washington, DC : WOLA, Dec. 2004).
20. See “Battles Won, A War Still Lost,” The Economist, Feb. 10, 2005 ; at http://www.economist.com/world/la/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3651694; Witness for Peace (WFP), “Plan Colombia’s First Two Years: An Evaluation of Human Rights in Putumayo,” April 2003.
21. (1 hectare = 2.47 acres). U.S. Dept. of State, “Why Americans Should Care.”
22. See WFP, “Plan Colombia ’s First Two Years.”
23. U.S. Senate, Conference Report 106-291, p. 59.
24. UNODC and GOC, Colombia : Coca Cultivation Survey , p. 19.
25. UNODC and GOC, Colombia : Coca Cultivation Survey , p. 11-15.
26. UNODC and GOC, Colombia : Coca Cultivation Survey , p. 23.
27. International Crisis Group, “War and Drugs in Colombia ,” Latin America Report No. 11, Jan. 27, 2005 , p. 23.
28. Alfredo Rangel Suarez, “Security Balance,” El Tiempo, July 30, 2004 ; at http://www.seguridadydemocracia.org/fromdedirector/op_ed_Columns/securitybalance.htm.
29. ICG, “War and Drugs,” p. 23.
30. ICG, “War and Drugs,” p. 23.
31. Clemencia Ramirez, Stanton, and Walsh, “Colombia,” p. 116.
32. Clemencia Ramirez, Stanton, and Walsh, “Colombia,” p. 116.
33. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), “U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is Beginning to Show Intended Results, but Programs Are Not Readily Sustainable,” July 2004; at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-726.
34. K. Larry Storrs and Connie Veillette, “Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors,” CRS Report for Congress, Updated Aug. 27, 2003, p. 12; Clemencia Ramirez, Stanton, and Walsh, “Colombia,” p. 116; Amicus brief prepared for OPIAC court case before the Constitutional Court, May 2002, p. 14; GAO, “U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia;” Bouvier, “Colombia Quagmire.”
35. Nancy San Martin, “U.S. Antinarcotics Plan for Colombia is Failing, Report Concludes,” Knight Ridder Tribune News Service, July 10, 2003 .
36. Walsh, “Are We There Yet?”
37. U.S. Senate, Conference Report 106-291, p. 53.
38. Connie Veillette, “Colombia: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, Updated Oct. 21, 2004, p. 5.
39. Center for International Policy, “Information about the Combatants,” at http://www.ciponline.org/Colombia/infocombat.htm.
40. ICG, “War and Drugs,” 18.
41. Rangel, “Security Balance.”
42. Neil Jeffery and Jess Hunter, “Four Year Evaluation of Plan Colombia ,” U.S. Office on Colombia Memo, July 8, 2004 .
43. Fundacion Seguridad y Democracia, “Colombia: Balance de Seguridad: 2004,” at http://www.seguridadydemocracia.org/.
44. Lisa Haugaard, Adam Isacson, Kimberly Stanton, John Walsh, and Jeff Vogt, Blueprint for a New Colombia Policy (Washington, DC: Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Center for International Policy, Washington Office on Latin America, U.S. Office on Colombia, March 2005), p. 1.
45. Fundacion Seguridad y Democracia, “Colombia.”
46. ABColombia Group, “InfoBrief,” Feb. 21, 2005 .
47. ABColombia Group, “InfoBrief,” Feb. 28, 2005 .
48. Mauricio García, De la Uribe a Tlaxcala: Procesos de Paz (Bogotá: CINEP, 1992), p. 274; Rangel, “Security Balance.”
49. Craddock, “Posture Statement.”
50. Cynthia J. Arnson, “The Social and Economic Dimensions of Conflict and Peace in Colombia ,” Latin American Program Special Report (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 2004), p. 10.
51. Rangel, “Security Balance.”
52. Craddock, “Posture Statement.”
53. Craddock, “Posture Statement;” Veillette, “ Colombia : Issues for Congress,” p. 5.
54. Connie Veillette, “Plan Colombia : A Progress Report,” CRS Report for Congress ( Washington , DC : Congressional Research Service, Feb. 17, 2005 ), p.9.
55. Tim Padgett with Ruth Morris, “The New Druglords,” June 13, 2004, at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,650686,00.html.
56. Padgett and Morris, “The New Druglords.” .
57. Human Rights Watch, “Colombia: Letting Paramilitaries Off the Hook: A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper,” Jan. 2005; Sam Logan with John Myers, “Legal Questions Mar Colombia’s Paramilitary Disarmament,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Americas Program, International Relations Center (IRC), Feb. 15, 2005; at http://www.americaspolicy.org/reports/2005/0502disarm.html.
58. S.2812/S.Rept. 108-346. Veillette, “Colombia,” p. 9.
59. Veillette, “Plan Colombia,” p. 12.
60. Fundacion Seguridad y Democracia and Oficina del Alto Comisionado de Paz, Presidencia de la Republica, Coyuntura de Seguridad No. 7, Enero 2005.
61. HRW, “Letting Paramilitaries Off the Hook,” p. 4; Amnesty International, “ Colombia ,” Press Release, Feb. 1, 2005 ; at http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/colombia/document.do?id=80256DD400782B8480256F9600618E07.
62. U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2004, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41754.htm.
63. Bibiana Mercado Rivera, “La historia de la salida de James Lemoyne, asesor especial de la ONU en Colombia,” El Tiempo, Jan. 22, 2005; at http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/coar/DER_HUMANOS/derechoshumanos/ARTICULO-WEB .
64. Andres Oppenheimer, “An Arms Race in Latin America ?” San Diego Union-Tribune, Oct. 22, 2004 .
65. ICG, “ Colombia ’s Borders,” p. i.
66. See International Crisis Group, “ Colombia and Its Neighbours: The Tentacles of Instability,” ICG Latin America Report No. 3, April 8, 2003 .
67. U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2004: Country Report, at http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?area=investigare&subm=19&ssm=29&cid=83.
68. ICG, “ Colombia ’s Borders,” p. 15.
69. Robert B. Charles, “Aid to Colombia .”
70. U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports
71. U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports 2004; Escuela Nacional Sindical and Union Europea, Informe sobre la violacion a los derechos humanos de los sindicalistas colombianos: enero 1-31 de diciembre 2004, at http://www.ens.org.co/aa/img_upload/40785cb6c10f663e3ec6ea7ea03aaa15/INFORME_FINAL_
    VIOLACIONES_CONTRA_SINDICALISTAS_COLOMBIANOS.pdf; see also Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), “Despite Claims by Colombian Government, Outlook for Colombian Trade Unionists Remains Bleak,” at http://wola.org/economic/colombia_trade_unionist_outlook_jsv.pdf.
72. WOLA, “Despite Claims by Colombian Government.”
73. U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports 2004.
74. Fundacion Seguridad y Democracia, “Colombia.”
75. Amnesty International, “ Colombia ,” Press Release, Feb. 1, 2005.
76. “An Alarming Report from the CCJ,” Plan Colombia and Beyond, Oct. 24, 2004, at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/blog/archives/000016.htm.
77. Jeffery and Hunter, “Four Year Evaluation.”
78. Juan Forero, “ Bogota Says Army Killed Union Chiefs,” New York Times, Sept. 8, 2004 .
79. Jeffery and Hunter, “Four Year Evaluation.”
80. Gary Marx, “Colombia Steps up Extraditions to U.S.,” Chicago Tribune, Dec. 13, 2004 .
81. Garry Leech, “Plan Colombia : A Closer Look,” Colombia Journal Online, July 2000, at http://www.colombiajournal.org/plancolombia.htm.
82. ICG, “War and Drugs,” p. 5.
83. Lower-middle income is estimated to be $1,480 GNI per capita. World Bank, “ Colombia at a Glance,” Sept. 16, 2004 , at http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/col_aag.pdf.
84. U.S. Senate, Conference Report 106-291, p. 56.
85. U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2004.
86. “ONG y Gobierno Se Contradicen en Cifras sobre Desplazamiento Forzado Durante 2004,” El Tiempo, Feb. 6, 2005.
87. Jeffery and Hunter, “Four Year Evaluation.”
88. U.S. Dept. of State, “A Report to Congress on United States Policy Toward Colombia and Other Related Issues,” Feb. 3, 2003 ; at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rpt/17140.htm.
89. Betsy Marsh, “Going to Extremes: The U.S.-Funded Aerial Eradication Program in Colombia ,” Latin America Working Group Education Fund, March 2004.
90. Clemencia Ramirez, Stanton, and Walsh, “ Colombia,” p. 116-24.
91. WFP, “Plan Colombia ’s First Two Years.”

Sources

“An Alarming Report from the CCJ.” Plan Colombia and Beyond. Oct. 24, 2004. At http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/blog/archives/000016.htm.

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