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Americas Program Commentary

Honduras Revisited

Robert White | November 11, 2009

Available in translation: La derrota negociada en Honduras

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Americas Program, Center for International Policy (CIP)

It is now possible to reconstruct with a fair degree of accuracy how the Obama administration turned an imminent diplomatic triumph into a negotiated defeat.

On October 20, Senator Jim DeMint stated that he had met with Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon and that he was pleased that the Department of State finally understood "that it is essential that these elections [in Honduras] go forward and are recognized." As a result, DeMint said he was "anxious" to release the holds he had placed on the nominations of Arturo Valenzuela to be assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs and Thomas Shannon, the present assistant secretary, to be ambassador to Brazil.

As Shannon well knew, this impending change of policy would give away the principal leverage the United States could bring to bear to persuade the de facto government to permit the prompt return of President Zelaya.

On October 28, a diplomatic delegation headed by Thomas Shannon arrived in Tegucigalpa to jump start the negotiations between the de facto regime and President Mel Zelaya. At a press conference, Shannon stated that the return of Zelaya is "central" to the concerns of the United States and the international community. Yet, he refused to say that his return was an essential component to any deal.

It is legitimate to infer that at this point de facto president Roberto Micheletti knew that the State Department had made a commitment to Senator DeMint that the United States would recognize the November 29 elections as valid regardless of whether Zelaya had been returned to office.

Under these circumstances any journeyman diplomat would immediately recognize that the only chance to achieve a lasting agreement would be to inform President Zelaya of the change in U.S. policy. Armed with this information, Zelaya could have insisted on a date certain for his return. With the backing of the U.S. delegation, there would have been a fighting chance that Micheletti would have agreed because time was running out.

It was, of course, possible, even probable, that negotiations would have failed, but that result would have been infinitely preferable to the charade where Zelaya signed an agreement under the illusion the United States would ensure his prompt reinstatement to power.

The result of this cynical and amateurish diplomacy could hardly have been worse.

The secretary of state triumphantly announces a breakthrough in Honduras. Micheletti responds that he has not yet agreed to the restitution of the elected president, and a deceived Zelaya states the agreement is dead. The diplomatic fiasco is complete.

There is still room for diplomatic maneuvering. For example, at the OAS, the United States could state that while it will recognize the outcome of the elections, it will support an OAS decision not to send hemispheric observers to certify the elections. This would almost surely result in the immediate return of Zelaya, for the United States would have restated its resolve not to be separated from its hemispheric partners.

Unless the Obama administration acts quickly to rescue this bungled outcome, Zelaya will take the only road open to him and call for his supporters to boycott the elections.

Most nations of the hemisphere will support him by refusing to recognize the elections and the crisis will drag on.

It is sad to contemplate how the Obama administration has botched a challenge in which it had the support of the entire hemisphere. No wonder President Lula of Brazil has accused President Obama of going back on his promise of a new relationship with Latin America.

Robert White is a former United States ambassador to Paraguay and El Salvador (1980-1981), where he was instrumental in the investigation of the rape and murder of four U.S. churchwomen by Salvadorean death squads. He is currently the president of the Center for International Policy.

©2009 Commonweal Foundation, reprinted with permission. For subscriptions: www.commonwealmagazine.org. Republished here by the Americas Program.

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For More Information

http://americas.irc-online.org/am/6544

Agreement to End Honduran Coup Marks Victory and Challenge
http://americas.irc-online.org/am/6538

Washington Plays Both Sides on Honduran Coup
http://americasmexico.blogspot.com/2009/10/washington-plays-both-sides-on-honduran.html


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Published by the Americas Program. Copyright © Creative Commons - some rights reserved.

Recommended citation:
Robert White, "Honduras Revisited," Americas Program Commentary (Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, November 11, 2009).

Web location:
http://americas.irc-online.org/am/6565

Production Information:
Author(s): Robert White
Editor(s): Laura Carlsen
Production: Chellee Chase-Saiz

Latest Comments & Conversation Area
Editor's Note: Editors read and approve each comment. Comments are checked for content only; spelling and grammar errors are not corrected and comments that include vulgar language or libelous content are rejected.
 
Name:  Meno Argenti Date: Nov 14, 2009
Going back over some points here and in another article in which you wrote might shed some light on your thoughts a few days ago and your thoughts now which seem somewhat opposed to what you said above.

Starting with your commentary called Thoughts On Honduras you say this:

(It appears that the crisis in Honduras is coming to a satisfactory conclusion. It is possible that things could still go badly wrong, but Assistant Secretary of State Tom Shannon has made it clear that unless Mel Zelaya sits in the presidential chair prior to the November 29 election neither the United States nor any other government of the hemisphere will recognize the election results.)

Thomas Shannon seems to have went in with a purpose,
1. To get DeMint to release his hold on his appointment to Brazil
2. To force an agreement by both parties where publicly none had been forthcoming.

One has to wonder if there was some double dealing going on with Shannon; especially how he seemed to be able to force an issue with President Zelaya by giving Mel a loaded deck of cards and a ray of hope that all of a sudden he would be allowed back in office. Because it appears from the wording of the accord that Mel was not going to get in using Congress to vote him back in when it was they who voted him out, and also producing a forged document that had is resignation on it. How could he then trust that same group of people to suddenly allow him back in, albeit even with limited or restricted power, is amazing in and of itself. There had to be some back door play going on where he was led to believe that Shannon took care of it all, and with the help of the Nacional Party and Pepe Lobo, who smiled when asked by Shannon if he could rely on his party to support Mel in the affirmative. Of course Pepe denies now any smile took place or even any agreement to restore Mel. Therefore it seems that Shannon changed course, and we all know, especially you, that Shannon only speaks on behalf of the Sec of State, and she only speaks according to Obama, to his policies. Therefore it is easy to now see with his complete turnaround about restoration that Obama never considered Zelaya's restoration to office, and that the policy has always been delay, delay, delay, and then at the last minute play from a loaded deck of cards on Mel's under siege mentality hoping he will sign anything to get out from under that siege; which was facilitated by the US administration to place him under. This is a classic system from the USA whereby they place a person under a siege mentality with all manner of devices available, much like the government uses to force a plea deal in a federal trial or court. Once the defendant has been under that siege after a few months he is softened up enough to enter into any negotiation with the US government, and will sign virtually anything just to get out from under that siege. We saw this with how they played Noriega, and while Noriega was softened up pretty quickly, Mel has stayed the course, and one believes when talking to him that he actually believed all that horse manure from the administration that they truly wanted him back, when in fact they never had any intention of allowing him back.

(I am worried by one statement that appeared in the Honduran press today attributed to Shannon in which he seems to say that regardless of how the congressional vote comes out the U.S. government would accept the result. If this is an accurate quote it could be asking for trouble)

Only now do you see the trouble this has caused, but not for the elites, just the poor. Of course one never knows just how much trouble one is in until the fat lady sings, so best to be prepared for anything. Matter of fact one would probably have to make sure that the military does something in the nature of protecting the sham elections, and has been said today by Gen Vasquez, he has plans that he is going to use against the resistance come election time.

(While U.S. diplomats occasionally wavered in carrying out the presidential guidance, Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon did not.)

That is correct sir. And when he got back to the USA he stated that policy in full view. And that was that the USA will recognize these sham elections carried out by a coup government with or without Zelaya restored. That is and always has been the policy of the USA. Why you wont write about it is beyond me, because if I can see it then you can easily see it. Plus I am not in a minority here either in this thinking.

(Had President Obama failed to play a leading role in restoring constitutional government, he would have fulfilled the dreams of every anti-American demagogue who accuses the United States of talking democracy but practicing expediency)

This has now been proven to be correct, he failed, and now what you say here that he will be accused of has come to pass.

(There is still room for diplomatic maneuvering.)

NO, that time is over, there is no more room for maneuvering. The USA had 6 months to make something positive happen in Honduras, and now those days and doors are closed. What happens next is up to the people of Honduras and the resistance, since they outnumber the Oligarchy a few million to one.

Thank you for your report and also your thoughts.

 
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