After months of bloodshed, violence, and vandalism, Bolivia may finally be back on the path to non-violent institutional reforms—no thanks to the U.S. government.
On Oct. 23, the Bolivian Congress—where the Senate is controlled by opposition parties—voted to allow the referendum on the new constitution, now scheduled for Jan. 25, 2009. This happened only after intense negotiations that resulted in modifications to over 100 articles, according to Vice President Alvaro Garcia.
Some 100,000 Bolivians from grassroots organizations celebrated the breaking of the impasse in the streets after marching to La Paz to support the president during the vote. Although the modifications have led to harsh criticisms from some groups and much work remains to be done to study the details of what was ceded to the opposition; including denying Evo Morales the possibility of a second consecutive term (thus reducing his rule from 2019 to 2014), concessions on breaking up large land-holdings, and respect for aspects of the provincial autonomy referendums held in May, international organizations have lauded the breakthrough. Meanwhile, some opposition groups and leaders have stated they will now concentrate their efforts on a campaign for a "no" vote, but most analysts believe that the government will win the referendum in January.
Several factors played into the acceptance of the vote on the constitution: the political negotiations, rapidly mobilized political support from the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), grassroots mobilization, and Morales' strength coming out of the Aug. 10 referendum that confirmed increased national support for the president.
Playground Bully Diplomacy and U.S. Isolation
During the period of opposition violence in early September that culminated in the massacre of at least 25 peasants in Pando, the U.S. government remained silent. Instead of defending the democratically elected government, the Bush administration—virtually alone in the hemisphere—refused to make even basic statements condemning the violence and vandalism by a well-funded and well-organized minority.
What was happening on the ground in Bolivia at this time should cause indignation to any moral human being. A video of the attacks on indigenous people in the streets by youth gangs affiliated with the opposition shows assaults and outright hatred, as well as a sense of impunity to abuse other people in broad daylight.
By not defending democratic institutions and the rule of law in Bolivia, the U.S. government has isolated itself when every other major nation in the region and international bodies including UNASUR, the OAS, the European Union, and the United Nations have come out to denounce the vandalism and attacks of groups of right-wing autonomists in the rebel half-moon region and others.
Now, as international organizations herald the political step forward in the Bolivian reform process, the U.S. government seems to be sulking. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called the agreement to hold the constitutional vote "a great achievement" and "a basis for working together in the immediate future to build a future that is inclusive, democratic, and prosperous for the country," and Raúl Lagos of the OAS called it a triumph for Bolivia.
How did the U.S. government become so isolated in the region and its embassy activities so suspect in Bolivia?
Several actions and reactions led to the present failure of U.S. diplomacy.
Under Bush-appointed Ambassador Philip Goldberg, relations between the two countries went from bad to worse. On Sept. 10, President Morales declared Goldberg persona non grata and expelled him. The embassy is now run by Charge d'Affairs Krishna Urs.
This is more than an ideological battle. Goldberg's work in the country had been criticized since shortly after his arrival in late 2006 for its bias toward the lowlands departments. What is undeniable is that he maintained a close relationship with the leaders of the lowlands provinces, and oversaw the channeling of what appears to be a disproportionate amount of U.S. funds to their regions.
The media has documented several incidences of inappropriate behavior on the part of the U.S. Embassy in Bolivia. One involved asking Fulbright scholars to spy on Venezuelans and Cubans in the country. What information is available shows funding to "decentralization" programs focused in rebel provinces. Ben Dangl concluded in an article for The Progressive that "Declassified documents and interviews on the ground in Bolivia prove that the Bush administration is using U.S. taxpayers' money to undermine the Morales government and co-opt the country's dynamic social movements ..."
It isn't easy to evaluate specific charges that U.S. funds and personnel are directly supporting the rebellion of groups in the half-moon provinces. There is circumstantial evidence to back up the claim on the public record—private meetings between then-Ambassador Goldberg and the rebel organization leaders in the Media Luna, funds to groups in opposition regions, and the shift in funding from central government programs to rebel provinces. But despite requests, USAID has not released the names of the organizations and specific activities that receive what it states is an annual $85 million in funding over the past two years. The refusal to provide this information is in itself an indication that there is something to hide.
At the height of violence when many feared outright civil war in Bolivia, instead of promising an investigation into the Bolivian government's serious allegations that the U.S. government was fomenting division, Chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Eliot Engel issued a letter affirming his support for his "good friend" Phil Goldberg. The letter, written in the paternalistic tone of a scolding parent, contained what could be construed as a veiled threat to President Morales: "I am outraged by President Morales's declaration that Ambassador Goldberg will be asked to leave Bolivia. All of us in Washington have tried to show restraint in responding to President Morales's deeply offensive personal attacks on our fine U.S. Ambassador in Bolivia, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and all other things American. But, this time Mr. Morales has gone too far."
Whether one accepts that the U.S. ambassador played a major role in the Bolivian conflict or not, the fact is that he failed dismally at his job of supporting peaceful and democratic change and respectful relations in the country he was assigned to. Goldberg's gaffes and snide remarks have been viewed as unbefitting a diplomatic representative and insulting to the Bolivian people. (Example: After President Morales proposed moving the headquarters of the United Nations to Bolivia following obstacles in entering the United States due to security measures, Goldberg stated to the press that he wouldn't be surprised if President Morales wanted to change the site of Disneyland too. He later apologized formally for the remark.)
Bush Cuts Off Bolivian Trade Preferences
Hostilities were stepped up this month when President Bush suspended Bolivia's trade preferences under the 10-month extension of the APTDEA passed by Congress. Bush justified shutting out Bolivia stating, "The Andea [sic] Trade Preference Act allows us to suspend trade preferences with countries that do not live up to their promises. And unfortunately, Bolivia has failed to cooperate with the United States on important efforts to fight drug trafficking."
A press release from the U.S. Trade Representative contains only this paragraph explaining the move: "The recent expulsion of U.S. Agency for International Development personnel and the removal of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration officials from the main areas of Bolivia's illegal coca production, a marked increase in cocaine production, the government's failure to close illegal coca markets, and publicly stated policies that increase government-sanctioned coca cultivation, have placed in doubt the Bolivian government's commitment to cooperate in the fight against drug trafficking."
There had already been indications that this would happen. On Feb. 29 of this year, White House spokesperson Dana Perino noted that both Ecuador and Bolivia could lose the preferences, among other things for concerns "including with respect to the treatment of U.S. investors," in reference to efforts to retain larger proportions of earnings from the exploitation of their nation's natural resources. On Sept. 16, the Bush administration announced that the Bolivian government was not cooperating with its counter-narcotics operations.
The suspension of trade preferences evoked criticism. The New York Times had earlier editorialized against revoking the preferences and Sen. Dick Lugar stated that more engagement, not less, was in order. "When Bolivia stands at the cusp of a new era, with a new constitution, U.S. assistance should be forthcoming as an effort to help Bolivia, and not to be an impediment to its progress."
Sec. of State Condoleezza Rice confirmed the move in a meeting on drug trafficking in Puerto Vallarta Mexico on Oct. 22, stating there was "no ideological test for cooperation and friendship with the United States." Her disavowal is scarcely believable, however, given that the 2008 UN Drug Report showed that coca cultivation in Colombia increased 27% last year, while cultivation in Bolivia increased only 5% and stands at a mere fraction of the Colombian amount. Colombia is also the main source of cocaine. The Bolivian government permits an established amount of traditional coca growing and makes a distinction between coca plants—an integral part of indigenous culture—and cocaine. While expanding the legal coca production and local industries that process coca leaves into teas, foods, and health products, the government has embarked on major programs to fight cocaine-processing labs.
The hard statistics about drug production (Peru also far exceeds Bolivia in cocaine production) and the reasons given by the USTR imply a policy based not on results but on full cooperation with the Bush government's military-enforcement "war on drugs" model and economic interests. The decision clearly came in retaliation for the expulsion of USAID programs from Bolivia's Chapare coca-growing region by farmers' organizations, who claimed USAID workshops were highly politicized. The expulsion of approximately 60 agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and of the NAS was tied up with the diplomatic break. President Morales had previously complained that the DEA was not reporting on all of its activities in the region. As the DEA reports, the Chapare is not targeted as a cocaine-producing area, and that the coca is "smuggled out of the Chapare to Cochabamba or to Santa Cruz, where it is sent to Brazil or converted into Cocaine Hydrochloride (HCL) for export to other countries." It also notes that the region also sees heavy traffic of Peruvian cocaine base. None of these other countries were cited for non-compliance, however.
At root are issues of how counter-narcotics activities should be undertaken and by whom. Reporting on the decision of coca growers not to enter into new aid agreements with USAID back in June, the European Coalition for Just and Effective Drug Policies noted: "It is crucial to look beyond the initial perception of an anti-American political stance to address the genuine popular discontent generated by these programs in order to properly re-evaluate the structure and impact of USAID initiatives. In an environment where the weight of US funding has diminished greatly, it makes sense to accept the Chapare farmers' 'no thank you,' and allow the region's residents to determine who they would like to work with to improve the lives of their families." The report noted that conditioning of aid based on forced eradication caused farmers to seek more cooperative agreements with other international agencies.
The purpose of the Andean trade preferences instituted by George Bush Sr. in 1991 was to provide a market for legal crops and dissuade coca growing. The original preferences lasted nearly 11 years, were renewed for four, and since the Bush Jr. administration came into office have entered into a short-cycle renewal process with the last renewals being for six, eight, and ten months. This creates tension for exporters whose livelihoods depend on the preferential tariffs and converts them into a national lobbying force to stay on the U.S. government's good side. Bolivian officials were already in Washington to negotiate the tariffs extension when they received word that the door had been slammed in their faces.
The Bolivian government has responded with a plan, endorsed by neighboring governments, to take up the slack in U.S. imports through exports to friendlier nations. The Secretary of State estimated the cost to Bolivia at 20,000 jobs and $150 million a year. The Democracy Center has begun a campaign to reinstate the trade preferences for Bolivia, based on the severe impact on small businesses and workers.
The U.S. government has not openly intervened in Bolivia. But it has engaged in private meetings between the embassy and secessionist groups, politicized its aid programs, "decertified" Bolivia for counter-narcotics aid, issued a travel advisory to discourage tourism and business trips, cut off trade preferences, and shown a lack of transparency regarding its activities. This is playground bully diplomacy and has no role in the adult world of international relations.
A nationwide vote on Bolivia's new constitution will be held on Jan. 25 and new elections will be held in December 2009 for president, vice president, Congress, and governors. Social forces in Bolivia are calling for unity at this point in the "re-founding" of the nation.
At this critical juncture, it's time for the U.S. government to walk the talk in Bolivia. The Bush administration has repeatedly stated its commitment to democracy and transparency. Yet in a nation bound by a colonial heritage of discrimination and violence against the indigenous majority, when the majority elected an indigenous president to represent their interests, U.S. actions have not lived up to these commitments.
Depending how you look at it, in the context of accusations of supporting a minority opposition and fomenting division, U.S. democracy promotion in Bolivia either failed dramatically or did exactly what it was really designed to do—to undermine a popularly elected government by sowing division and fomenting insurrection. Even as the Bush administration and congressional members responded in outrage (while still failing to provide documentation of where aid is provided) against accusations of meddling, none can be ignorant of the long history the U.S. government has in this area.
Democratic principles and clear rules for international trade cannot be applied selectively according to ideological criteria that the U.S. public does not even necessarily share. Part of restoring the U.S. image in the world is to support each nation's right to democratic self-determination.
It is U.S. citizens' right to evaluate possible U.S. involvement in whipping up and consolidating the violent opposition in Bolivia. The only lesson learned from impunity is how to continue to behave badly. The appointment of a new ambassador dedicated to peaceful resolution of conflict and respectful relations between the two nations would be a good indication of a needed change in attitude during this crucial moment in Bolivia's history.
Laura Carlsen (lcarlsen@ciponline.org) is director of the Americas Program (www.americaspolicy.org) in Mexico City.
