Last Aug. 10, Bolivia finally voted in the recall referendum that had held the country in commotion for at least three months prior. That day, for the first time ever all citizens were called to cast a ballot—not to elect their rulers, but to ratify or revoke them midway through their terms. The results confirm that the divisions in Bolivian society are brutal, but at the same time the referendum opens certain channels through which, perhaps, some new possibilities can be glimpsed.

The forces in confrontation are clearly differentiated. On the one hand, President Evo Morales's ruling party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS, Movement toward Socialism) and on the other, the four-governors' coalition from the Eastern provinces commonly known as "The Crescent." Both groups have built up their political capacity based on their links to constituents from different segments of the population. But beyond that, the conflict is embedded in a much deeper and historically rooted social conflict that has to come to the fore in Bolivian society today.

A preliminary schematic set of distinctions breaks down into: indigenous peoples vs. q'aras1 (whites or mestizos); workers vs. capital and land owners; and, more recently, qullas (mostly indigenous migrants) vs. cambas (Santa Cruz natives). Based on these distinctions, we can assert that on Aug. 10 indigenous people, workers, and qullas voted against what they perceive as the consolidation of a growing capacity for political intervention on the part of the q'aras, cambas, capitalist, and land-owning classes. They demonstrated overwhelmingly and en masse for Morales's ratification as President of the Republic. They also voted to recall the governors of three Western provinces: La Paz, Cochabamba, and Oruro.

[This report was written Aug. 11-12 based on vote projections and the official web page of the National Electoral Court. On the Sunday of the referendum, every indication pointed to the recall of the governor of Oruro but by Aug. 13, the provincial electoral court announced that "with the results of the last rural polls from the most remote areas of the province, the tendency that showed the removal of the governor of Oruro had been reversed and he had been ratified by tenths of a percentage point."]

In virtually every corner of the country's Western geography—in La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, and Cochabamba provinces—the vote against the Crescent's intentions and in favor of Morales was absolute, compact, and overwhelming. The various meanings of this vote, which interacts differently in each region, will be analyzed further herein.

In contrast with the above, at the regional level in the provinces of Santa Cruz, Beni, and Tarija,2 the vote proved extremely complex. The three provincial governors—leaders of the so-called "provincial-autonomy project"—were ratified by a vast majority and gained a significant increase in votes compared to the numbers they received in December 2005. Voting margins for Morales's ratification in the four zones, however, also notably increased. In Beni for instance, the province where Morales obtained the fewest votes in 2005, electoral preferences for him doubled, although they did not exceed the 50% needed for ratification. Likewise in Santa Cruz, the vote showed a modest, but important, increase in the support to the central government's performance, comparing the percentage of favorable votes there in 2005 to the percentage obtained in 2008. This is true although the city of Santa Cruz is the most inflexible core of the private-business/estate-holder elites' political counter-offensive. Finally, in Tarija a similar scenario is observed. These results reveal that the Eastern elites' power base is at best "porous" even within their own provinces.

It is worthwhile to scrutinize the data to gain a more comprehensive vision of what figures alone express:

Some Hypotheses Arising From the Referendum Data

The first obvious aspect is that the figures reflect both the geographical distribution and the modalities of the fundamental political conflict. In the country's three Western provinces of La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí, whose ethnic make-up is complex and notably indigenous, and where the majority work in the fields or mines or factories, voters hurried to the polling stations as in a collective mission and reconfirmed their support for Morales—and their rejection of the Eastern elites' offensive—with a solid 80% of votes in favor.

In the East, in turn, votes for the government increased too in all of the provinces except Chuquisaca, which at present is the contended-for territory between MAS's government and the Crescent's forces. Special attention should be given to the vote spike of 60% in Tarija, 100% in Beni, and 200% in Pando. The only location where support for MAS still shows stagnation or very light increase is Santa Cruz, where it changed from 33% in 2005 to 38% in 2008.

At the national level, therefore, the pro-Morales vote increase from the level obtained in 2005 in both the Western region in the Eastern zone, suggests a major consolidation of support for the government: people want Morales to stay, they want him in the presidency. This is no minor sign.

At the same time, voting preference was conserved or increased for the Crescent's governors—in Santa Cruz, Rubén Costas with 20% more votes than 2005, and in Tarija for Mario Cossío with a 12% increase. And to the north of the country, in the least densely populated regions, there was also a significant rise in voters' support of governors. Ernesto Suárez, in Beni, got a 21% increase and Leopoldo Fernández, in Pando, got an 8% increase.

These two "intersecting votes" speak, on one level, of a massive ratification of support for Morales as president, plus a consolidation of important regional leaderships. In addition, they point to a not unforeseeable, though difficult to understand, trait: a recall referendum, insofar as it is an authentic liberal measure for the broadening of democracy, is not a zero-sum game where one side loses while the other wins. In Bolivia's case, obviously the two visible poles of the current MAS-Crescent confrontation simply ratified their influence capabilities and territorial control.

They did so, however, on totally different bases: in the Western regions, the overwhelming preference for Morales was publicly discussed in many formal and informal gatherings. Some persons interviewed in Districts Five and Six of El Alto city on Aug. 10 explained that in their neighborhood meetings they "had conversed" on the importance of collectively throwing themselves into "propping up" Morales to "secure and strengthen him" in the face of what "the cambas" are doing. In the East in turn, according to several sources in the region, the voting had an extremely high clientele content, not disregarding the formidable dirty-propaganda offensive spread by the media particularly over those zones.

The paradox of this result, and the difficulty to grasp it, was made visible from the evening of Sunday, August 10, when festivities in Santa Cruz for its governor's ratification and in Cochabamba for its governor's ousting, stood in stark contrast (all of this broadcast by television) with the dispirited celebration in La Paz and the mixed and conciliatory presidential message that expressed gratitude for the support granted and yet once again offered "dialogue" to provincial authorities who in different tones have shown their lack of interest in reaching any agreement. The President's speech, delivered from Palacio Quemado in La Paz after projections of results were out, was heckled by the crowd in Plaza Murillo, which chanted "mano duro" or "hard line" whenever Morales mentioned new negotiations.

Part of the reason could be that the week preceding the referendum the climate in Bolivia was tense and confusion reigned. Mobilization of adherents of the elite autonomic separatism in Tarija impeded a meeting in that city between Morales, Cristina Kirchner, and Hugo Chávez. They achieved this by occupying Tarija's airport. The next day Vice President Alvaro García Linera was not permitted to land in Santa Cruz, and the same happened to Juan Ramón Quintana, secretary of the presidency, who could not land in Beni or Pando because some followers of the regional leaders placed heavy machinery on the runways before the impassive gaze of the police and the military.

Undoubtedly all these actions, though no more than bullying by the elites as seen in media images that showed participation of a few individuals and not in any way massive mobilization, created a commotion on the public scene. At any rate, these events put people on edge and supplied sufficient material to saturate newscasts. The also created a sensation of ungovernability and lack of strength and direction on the part of public officials.

The federal government's spokespersons responded repeatedly with an equally absurd triumphalism. On Thursday, Aug. 8, García Linera, Minister of Government Rada, and Minister of the Presidency Quintana still predicted a recall referendum in which it would be proven that the people did not support their respective provincial authorities. Perhaps MAS government's officials sincerely believed that Crescent's governors' backing would not increase at the rate it finally did, or that support for Morales in those regions would prove higher than what was achieved.

Morales's address to the nation on Aug. 10 left the population flabbergasted for its tone and conception. It was as if he could not fully grasp what was happening. His message, symptomatically, ended by emphasizing the slogan "Motherland or Death!" which contributed even more to rarify the understanding of the government's assessment of polling results and how it communicated them to the public.

Society, Cautiously, Confronts the Regional Elites/Government Split

Delving a bit deeper in the analysis of the referendum's data, two major issues arise that should be highlighted.

The first issue is the relative "autonomy" that people had at the moment of their vote. This analysis shows clear differences, especially in La Paz and Oruro. During the lead-up to the referendum, MAS and several government officials campaigned intensely for a YES vote for Evo/Alvaro and a NO vote in the box corresponding to the provincial governor, especially in those locations where the latter were not on the MAS's side.

In the East, the opposite phenomenon took place. Nevertheless, in La Paz and Oruro a great difference emerges in this pattern: while in both provinces 80% voted to ratify Morales, in La Paz only 63% voted for ousting the governor (which was enough to recall him anyway); in Oruro preliminary results indicated that 53% of voters voted against the MAS governor. One interpretation of these results in the provinces with the highest proportion of Aymara population is that while there is full agreement on the necessity and importance of defending Morales and his government and they voted in a massive block for ratification, they were unwilling to extend a "blank check" to the government. Instead they chose to send a signal that they are perfectly able, as always, to calculate and take their interests into account and decide on their own responsibility and risk.

In La Paz, the province with the most voters, at least 200,000 individuals "crossed-voted": they supported both Morales and their governor, or, in other words, they supported Morales but decided to allow a public official not affiliated with MAS to remain in the governorship. In Oruro, the "crossed" vote proved even more interesting: the MAS-affiliated governor was apparently ousted while an equal resolve was applied for ratifying President Morales.

From the opposite camp, in Beni, in Northeastern Bolivia, as well as in Tarija to the South, something similar happened, though not as notable in percentage or numerical terms: 6% of Beni voters simultaneously ratified their governor and their president; 8% of them did the same in Tarija. These percentages involve around 10,000 and 12,000 people respectively.

The Recalled Governors: Now Who will be Chosen to Run for Governor—and Most Important, How?

Two out of nine Governors were recalled, in La Paz and Cochabamba. Cochabamba and La Paz share a common trait: both Manfred Reyes Villa and José Luis Paredes are political old-timers who have been public servants at least since Banzer's presidential regime 10 years ago, a characteristic also shared by Mario Cossío, the ratified governor of Tarija, a member of the former MNR for many years. However, unlike Cossío, Paredes and Reyes Villa are not decisively installed in the "orbit" of the Santa Cruz and Beni elites who lead the Crescent's offensive against the federal government. Reyes Villa moved closer to their positions, and in January 2007, the Crescent's influence produced the Cochabamba City social confrontation between youth from the wealthy North Zone, and neighbors in the South, along with some cocaleros or coca growers, which resulted in at least three brutal deaths. Following the deaths, a paralyzing social polarization took hold especially in the city, which has now been vigorously reverted by the recall of Reyes Villa's mandate in the polls. In 2007 in Cochabamba an experiment in induced social decomposition was conducted, much like the one in process in the Chuquisaca province since November that same year where, unfortunately, it has been more successful.

As for Paredes, he has tried to remain in a position equally distant both from the MAS government and some of the actions and demands of the Santa Cruz-Beni-Tarija governors/elites coalition. His recall last Sunday indicates that now, in Bolivia, there is no room to remain on the fence. As shipwrecked survivors of the old political dominant party structure that collapsed between 2003 and 2005, Reyes Villa's and Paredes's political programs sank in the end as a result of the possibility of recalling the mandate of authorities.

Now that two governors have been recalled, two important political positions are left vacant. Prior to the choice of governors itself, the main event in this case will be the selection of the candidate running for MAS for each of these public charges. When elections take place in these provinces MAS is sure to win, hence the relevance of that party's candidate selection in the coming months.

Under these conditions, reorganization and realignment of forces will take place in the following weeks, which will show signs for better understanding the political possibilities and the trends of the process of strengthening the conditions now occurring in Bolivia. The MAS has three possibilities: either elect a candidate who strengthens its own party structure; or seek to establish an alliance with other local grassroots and party forces, like for instance, La Paz Mayor Juan del Granados's No Fear Movement.

But the most prudent and healthy option would be to allow the complex mechanism of deliberation and assessment of possibilities to be set in motion by a wide range of social structures and groups, in particular in Bolivia's Aymara region. This would help establish some basis of consensus from the bottom up for the candidate chosen. This last option is the one least likely to be followed, although in El Alto, at least, the informal decision-making mechanisms of the city's men and women could already be seen functioning on the Sunday the referendum was held.

After the referendum it became clear that the only partisan and institutional force that has national scope and influence is the MAS. The issue of its ability to build real alliances between the governing party and social organizations will again be put to the test. Perhaps, after the bitter experience of the Constitutional Assembly and by analyzing the vote in the West, Morales and MAS will understand that society supports them and is ready to defend them but desires less vertical forms of relating and more respect toward political autonomy built from the bases up.

The months to come will prove interesting—perhaps conclusive.

Some Bird's-eye Perspectives

There are now two diametrically opposed issues on the public agenda. Discussion on these issues was stalled last May when the referendum was announced, and now that it's over they will surely immediately reappear to draw the diagram of the new political scenario. One hand is the approval (also subject to referendum) and promulgation of the new Political Constitution drafted by the Constitutional Assembly during its sessions from Aug. 6, 2006 to late 2007. The other is that Santa Cruz and Tarija are awaiting application of the "Autonomic Statutes" voted in the previous referendum on May.

On the evening of Aug. 10, Santa Cruz's governor exclaimed "ahora sí" ("now's the time"). Based on their show of strength in the polls (that is, magnifying ad infinitum the provincial victory and disavowing or ignoring the national vote), the provincial governments will proceed to establish and enforce the statutes' provisions, among them the formation of a provincial police force and the prerogative of instituting and collecting taxes, as well as the summons to elect a Provincial Council, a kind of provincial legislative branch.

For its part, what the Morales government faces in terms of political procedure is the referendum to approve the new constitution. This is a politically and operatively more difficult task, which must adhere to instituted terms and modalities. It also has the possibility of carrying out new nationalizations and establishing new state companies, such as the recently created public cement company, or of more energetically pushing agrarian reform and agro-business' transformation/de-monopolization.

All these measures seem to be under consideration. But while they would serve to consolidate the government's financial capacity and vie for surplus amounts to be destined to the private or the public interest, they feed into the form of social polarization analyzed here, a problem the referendum failed to solve.

When Morales spoke of "reaching consensus" on the new constitution and the autonomy statutes, the crowd yelled vehemently, "a hard line!" A hypothetical political compromise seems impossible today. Especially if at the same time there are gradual advances in returning to the state what had been privatized or competes with corporations and business for the production of certain goods.

In Bolivia today, above all in the West, the population defends Morales, protects him, identifies with him, and loves him. They know that he is a chisel with which to chip away, little by little, at the centuries-old elites' power. They know that he is president by the decision of everyone and that he arrived where he now is through the tenacious struggles and revolts that ushered in the 21st Century here in the Andean heights.

These kind and determined men and women also show him that there is political restiveness, that there is uneasiness with important officials—as in Oruro—and that maybe it is advisable to give more of a voice to society, at its own initiative and its own risk. Confidence in Morales continues and increases, but, as is known from Bolivian society's deepest vital core, political transformations of the institutional and regulatory structure of inherited power are urgently needed.

End Notes

1. The distinction q'ara/indigenous was included in political discourse more than three decades ago by Katarism. Q'ara, in its contemporary meaning, alludes not only to ethnic origin but links the same to the white or mestizo individual made wealthy by the work of the indigenous. In turn, camba/qulla is a distinction alluding to the individual's origin, especially in Santa Cruz. Camba, formerly a derogatory term, designates the individual born in Santa Cruz. "Qulla", on the other hand, is how people from Santa Cruz and especially its élite designate migrants, settlers and workers who have come from the Western, mostly indigenous, zones and settled in the country's East in the last decades.
2. The case of Chuquisaca province, a recent and peculiar member of the Crescent component, is a special one. Its governorship was not at stake, and the division between ratification or recall resulted in an eloquent 50/50.

For More Information

Related Articles:

For media inquiries, email americas@ciponline.org or call (202) 536-2649.